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ABSTRACT
In this paper a commonly made assumption in the neoclassical labour
supply model is mitigated by introducing hours restrictions into the
model. That is, the possibility that an individusl is faced with the
limited availability of jobs with different, distinct, numbers of hours
has been incorporated. Moreover, it has been taken into account that the
wage rate may be dependent on the number of working hours. This leads to
a nonlinear budget constraint. The results for females suggest not only
the existence of hours restrictions, but also of a nonlinear budget
constraint. Including both features generates a better fit of the
predicted dístribution of hours than the standard Tobit model.
1
1. Introduction
It is well known that in general the predicted distribution of hours
in the standard neoclassical labour model fits the actual data on hours
very poorly. In this paper we want to tackle this problem. To that end we
build a model, which takes its fundaments from Moffitt [1984], who made
the budget constraint nonlinear by introducing hours dependent wages, and
from Dickens and Lundberg [1985], who dealt with hours restrictions. This
model is estimated on Dutch data.
One reason for the bad fit of the hours distribution could be the in-
valid assumption of a fixed wage rate. Moffitt, among others extended the
standard neoclassical labour supply model by making the wage rate en-
dogenous and found significant effects of hours of work on the wage rate,
leading to an S-shaped budget constraint. This was in support of the
hypothesis put forward by Barzel [1973], namely that the marginal produc-
tivity (and thus the marginal wage rate) eventually declines at higher
number of working hours. In The Netherlands this argument does not seem
very convíncing, since most before-tax wage rates are independent of hours
of work. Rosen [1976] argued that the wage rate might depend on the number
of working hours, due to the fact that there exist different markets for
jobs with varying numbers of hours. And there is no reason that the market
for Full time jobs will clear at the same wage rate as the market for part
time jobs. Especially in The Netherlands, where there is a growing in-
terest in part time jobs, mainly by women, this might be an important
consideration. Another reason for making the net wage rate dependent on
hours of work is the progressive tax system.
Although the model with hours dependent wages fitted the hours
distribution better than the standard Tobit model (Moffitt [1984]), the
assumption of fixed wage rates seems not to be the only invalid as-
sumption. More important in this respect is the assumption that
individuals can freely choose the number of hours they prefer to work. If
the diversity of the offered hour packages is large enough, if workers
have complete information about job opportunities, and if they are mobile
between jobs, they will choose the job with exactly the number of hours
they prefer. If workers are not perfectly mobile, for example, they might
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not be able to work their preferred number of hours. They will choose to
work the number of houra that correaponds with the one among the available
job offers, yielding highest utility. To our irnowledge the first study to
estimate a model with hours restrictions on micro data is a paper by
Moffitt [1982]. The way we have incorporated hours restrictions is largely
based on an article by Dickens and Lundberg. They present a model, in
which individuals may face constraints on their number of working hours.
Their model ia set up as a discrete choice model, in which each worker can
choose from e limited number of job offers, with fixed numbers of hours.
However they assumed the wage rate to be fixed. In this paper we build a
model which incorporates both hours restrictions and hours dependent
wages.
The starting point of our enalysis is the standard neoclassical model
of labour supply, in which individuals maximise a quasi-concave utility
function subject to a linear budget constraint. Implicit in this model are
the assumptions that labour supply behaviour can be described by a static
model, that the wage rate is fixed and that an individuel is able to work
the number of hours he prefers to work. In this paper we will relax the
last two assumptions. That is, the wage rate is made dependent on the num-
ber of hours worked, and we incorporate the possibility that an individual
is confronted with a limited availability of jobs with different, dis-
tinct, numbers of hours. Therefore, it seems appropriate to reformulate
the model in terms of s discrete choice problem. By taking into account
the availability of jobs with different numbers of hours and hours depen-
dent wages we take a first step in the direction of modelling both the
supply side and the demand side of the labour market.
In Section 2 we present a model with both hours restrictions and
hours dependent wages. Hours restrictions are incorporated by assuming
that employers offer jobs with a fixed number of hours. Workers face the
market distribution of these employment opportunities. An individuel
chooses the number of hours correaponding with that one among the
available job offers that yields highest utility. Notice that the in-
dividual is still s utility maximizing person, although he maximizes
utility on a subset of ell possible numbers of hours. This subset can be
empty, because the number of job offers is a random variable of which zero
is one of t~e possible outcomes. Consequently, the model distinguishes
3
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Wages are made endogenous
by specifying a wage equation in which the wage rate depends on hours of
work and squared hours of work. In Section 3 estimation results for
females will be presented and we discuss the improvement of fit of the
various model extensions. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
In this section we will first point out in what way hours restric-
tions can be incorporated in a standard labour supply model and we discuss
the implications of dropping the wage exogeneity assumption. For
notational ease subscripts referring to individuals are omitted. In
Section 2.1 the likelihood function is derived conditional on the budget
constraint. In Section 2.2 the likelihood function will be formulated for
the joint wage-hours model.
2.1 Incorporation of hours restrictions
Starting point of the analysis is the following direct utility
function ( see Hausman [1980], Moffitt [1984]):
loB(U(h.Y)) - -log(à~-Sh) - H!h-Xá-e-Ry)(X-~h)
where
h :- working hours
y :- disposable income
X:- vector of individual characteristics such as age and family
composition
e:- random variable, representing unobserved tastes for work
y, p and b are parameters
y~0, pc0.
(2.1)
The restrictions ~r)0 and pc0 are sufficient conditions for monotonicity of
the utility function in y.
Maximizing the utility function (2.1) subject to a linear budget
constraint yields a linear labour supply function:
4
h- Pu t áw ' Xb ~ e (2.2)
where
u :- nonlabour income
w :- wage rate.
The wage equation is specified as
where
w- Zy t bh t ch2 4 v
Z:- vector of individual characteristics relevant for one's
productivity, such as age and education
v :- error term
y, b, and c are parameters
We assume:
l"~ ~N ~ ~~J ~ ~óaa áeav~ ~P e v v
(2.3)
If b and c are equal to zero, then the wage rate is fixed and we are
dealing with a linear budget constraint. Then the labour aupply function
given in (2.2) follows from maximizing utility function (2.1). As we have
argued before, there are several reasons why the wage rate could depend on
hours. This will be the case if there exist different markets for full
time and part time jobs, or if there is a progressive tax system. When
this wage equation is substítuted into the budget constraint
Y - wh ' u
a nonlinear budget constraint results:
(2.4)
Y- hZw t bh2 { ch3 4 u t hv. (2.5)
Maximizing the utility function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint
(2.5) yields a nonlinear first order condition in the form of a third or-
der polynomial in h. Estimation of this model would require analytical or
numerical solutions to this cubic equation in h. But as will be explained
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presently we reformulate the model as a discrete choice problem in which
utility is compared between a finite number of points of the budget
constraint ( 0, hl, h2,.. , hm). Therefore i t suffices to know the exact
specification of the utility function.
We suppose an individual is restricted in his choice of working
hours, due to a lack of information or a lack of mobility. If it is as-
sumed that employers offer j obs with fixed numbers of hours, then the
worker has to choose from a finite set of jobs, offering fixed numbers of
hours. Since working zero hours is always possible, i t will be treated as
a special case. Let us assume that the market distribution of job offers
is the same for all workers, such that the probability of a job offer,
which involves h~(~0) working hours is:
Pr(job offer h-h~) - p~, .~-1,...,m. (2.6)
So we assume that there are m different values of working hours h~)0. And
there is always the option of working zero hours. Then the labour supply
decision becomes a discrete choice out of, let us say, N job offers, drawn
from this market distribution of offers, and not working. If the number of
job offers, N, approaches infinity, this model becomes a model without
hours restrictions, see the Appendix. In that case the worker's behaviour
can be described by a discrete choice model in which all possible values
of hours are available:
h- hj iff U(hj,yj) ~ U(hk,yk) k-0,...,m and k~j {2.7)
where U is specified by equations (2.1) and (2.5).
The index k covers the whole range of possible values of hours. However,
if individuals face a limited choice of all job offers, then the index k
only covers the range of received job offers and zero. One way to model
this restricted choice problem is to write down ell possible sets of job
offers, with correaponding probabilities that an individusl will get such
a set of offers. Then the probability of observing hj hours of work is the
sum over all sets of the probability that h~ hours is preferred to all job
offers in a specific set, times the probability of occurence of that set.
Although this way of modelling is appealing for its conceptual simplicity,
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it is computationally cumbersome. In this paper we will therefore use a
different, equivalent approach. In the Appendix the two methods are writ-
ten down explicitly. The idea is that an individuel is only observed to
work hj hours if he received at least one job offer hj and íf he preferred
this job offer to all the other, different offers he received and to not
working. The individual is observed as a non-worker if he preferred zero
hours to ell job offers he received.
Given the values of the two random variables e and v it is possible
to construct e set Jj consisting of ell job offers preferred less than
h-h.:J
Jj(e,v) -{ h~: U(h~,y(h~);e,v) C U(hj,y(hj);e,v), ~-1,...,m} (2.8)
Notice once more that h-0 is not treated as a job offer. The set Jj u{hj}
contains all possible job offers an individual could have received if hj
is observed. If this individual would have received an offer that does not
belong to Jj u{hj}, he would have preferred that offer, and he would not
have been observed to work hj hours. Define Qj as the probability that one
draw out of the market distribution of job offers will yield an offer
which is less preferred than the chosen hj, i.e. the offer is in the set
J.:
J
Qj - ~ p~
h~EJj
(2.9)
Then the probability of observing h-hj (hj~0) if N job offers are received
can be written as :
Rj -(Qj ~ pj)N- Q~ if U(hj,y(hj);e,v) ~ U(O,y(0);e,v)
- 0 otherwise
(2.10)
The first line in equation (2.10) describes the probability that the in-
dividual only received offers which he preferred less than hj and that at
least one job offer was h-hj. This is equivalent to saying that this in-
dividual d-,ew N times a job offer out of J. u{h.} (i.e. (Q. ; p.)N) but
J J J J
that he did not draw offers only out of Jj (Q~). The second line in
equation (2.10) says that if zero is preferred to hj then the probability
of observing hj is zero, since zero is always available.
The probability of observing h-0 when N job offers are received is
simply:
NRO - QO (2.11)
Q~ is the probability that the N job offers are less preferred than h-0.
Recall that so far all formulas are derived, conditional on the values of
e and v. Removing the conditioning on v is equivalent to taking into ac-
count the endogeneity of the wage rate, and formulating a joint hours-wage
probability. This is postponed to the next subsection.
The wey to remove the conditioning on the unobserved taste peraneter
e, is to integrate it out. In doing so, one should remember that the
probability Rj is also conditional on the value of e. Then the likelihood
of observing h-hj hours given v, can be written as:
m
L(h-hj~v) - f ~(e~v)Rj(e) de (2.12)
where Sc is the normal density function of e given v.
It is clear that Jj, the set of job offers less preferred than hj, is a
step function in e, because only discrete values of hours are considered.
Step changes occur at e-ejk, i.e. when e takes on such a value that
working h, hours yields the same utility as working hk hours. See the
J
Appendix for the exact formula of ejk. For values of e between e~k and
ejk-1 the set Jj(k) remains the same. Jj(k) is defined as Jj for
e~k-l~e~ e~k. Switching from integrals to sums, we can rewrite (2.12) as
follows:
m
L(h-hj~v) - Pr( e~ ej0~v) Rj(0) }k~1Pr( ejk-lte( ejk~v)
Rj(k) t




Rj(k) - Pr( h-hjl ejk-l~e( ejk, v).
Equation (2.13) can be written explicitly as:
For all h~0 and h~h :m
j-1
L(h-hj~v) - ~ { [ ~(ejk) - ~(ejk-1)] Rj(k)} ~k-1
[ ~(ejj~l) - ~(ejj-1)] Rj(j.l)
,
[ 1 - ~(ejm)] Rj(rest)
m
~ { [ ~(ejk) - ~(ejk-1)] Rj(k)} tk-j'2
(2.14)
For h-0:
L(h-0~v) - ~(e01) RO(1) f
m




[ 1 - ~(e~)] RO(rest)
For h-h :m
m-1
L(h-hm~~) - ~ { [ ~(e~) - ~(e~-1)] Rm(k)} .k-1
[ 1 - ~(emm-1)] Rm(m)
(2.16)
where ~ is the cumulative normal distribution function of e conditional on
v and R~(rest) is defined as in equation (2.10) where e takes a value
larger than ejm.
A few remarks have to be made with respect to equations (2.14)-
(2.16). First, the values ejk have to be monotonically increasing in k.
This will be the case if the budget constraint is linear, but if it is
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nonlinear this need not be the case. Then they have to be sorted, before
the summing in equation (2.14)-(2.16) takes place. Second, the summation
is split into two parts by the third term. The reason for this is that ejj
is not defined. The ranges ejj-1(e~ ejj and ejjCe( ejjyl are combined in
ejj-1(e( ejj41.
Until now, we have taken the number of job offers, N, to be fixed.
But as mentioned in the introduction, in order to be able to capture the
possibility of involuntary unemployment, we make N stochastic. The only
difference with the formulas above is that we have to take expectations
with respect to the number of job offers:
Nmax
L'(h-h.lv) - ~ L(h-h.~v,N).p(N)
~ N-0 ~
where L' is the likelihood when N is a random variable
L is given in equations (2.14)-(2.16)
Nmax is the maximum number of job offers
p is a discrete probability distribution.
(2.17)
Because L(h-0~v, N-0)-1 (see formula (2.11)), equation (2.17) turns into
Nmax
L'(h-0~v) - p(0) } ~ L(h-O~v,N)-p(N)
N-1
(2.18)
for non-workers. So non-working is either explained by the fact that an
individual didn't receive any job offers at all (p(0)) or because he
preferred not working in the case he received N~0 job offers (second
term).
Because L(h-hj~v, N-0)-0 (see formula (2.10)), equation (2.17) can be
rewritten as
Nmax





2.2 Formulation of the joint wage-hours oodel.
As yet the model has been derived conditional on v. The removal of
this conditioning amounts to adding the wage equation to the model and
formulating the joint probability of observing h~ hours of work and the
corresponding wage rate w. For workers the joint probability can be
defined as:
L'(hzh~,w) ~ L'(h~h~~v) L'(v~w - Zy - bh3 - ch~) (2.20)
The first term of this probability is given explicitly in equetions
(2.14)-(2.16). For nonworkers equation (2.20) has to be adapted, since for
nonworkers the wage rate is not observed. Therefore, the unobservable wage
rate must be integrated out. This results in the following likelihood of
observing h-0:
Nmax
1-'(h-0) - P(0) t ~ [ ~(u01) ROÍ1) .N-1
m
~ { [ ~(u0k) - ~(u0k-1)] Rp(k)} ,k-2
[ 1 - ~(u0m)] RO(rest)]~P(N)
(2.21)
where u0k - e0k } ~'
As we can see from equation (2.8)-(2.10) the term RO(k) is calculated for
different values of e. Calculation of RO(k) implies calculation of utility
levels, but for non-workers we only have a joint unobserved effect u-et~v,
so we cannot calculate utility levels. We are able to circumvent this
problem by using the fact that the only thing we need is the ranking of
the utilities in different points and not the actual values of the
utilities. See the Appendix for further details.
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3. Data and estimation results
The model described in Section 2 has been estimated by means of
maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is a complex function of the
parameters and consequently is maximized by making use of a numerical op-
timization procedure.
The data come from a labour mobility survey, conducted in The
Netherlands in 1985 by order of the Organization of Strategic Labour
Market Research (OSA). The sample contains 849 females in families. Sample
information i s given in Table I.
Table I Sample Characteristics
Variable
hours of work per week
Mean (Stand. Dev.) Minimum Maximum
net wage rate (guilders per hour)
age
educ2 (second level of education)
educ3 (third level of education)
educ4 (fourth level of education)
non-labour income (guild. per week)
dummy for children younger than 6
family size
dsect (dummy for sector one is
educated in; social-0, econ.-2,
semi-social, semi-econ.-1)
number of observations 849
number of working females 331
10.6 ( 15.4) 0 60r ~ w
2~.3 ( 12.5) 2 60
11 M i1
12.5 ( 4.5) 5.8 39.4
7.1 ( 9.9) 18 61
0.26( 0.44) 0 1
0.38( 0.49) 0 1
0.02( 0.14) 0 1
~14 (302) 0 2693
0.26( 0.44) 0 1
3.46( 1.24) 2 lo
0.29( 0.~0) 0 2
~.- These numbers apply to working females only.
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In Tab1e II estimation results are presented. In approximating the budget
constraint we have divided the hours range into 4-hours intervals. The
first column shows results for the model without hours restrictions and
with a wage equation in which the wage is not dependent on hours of work.
In principle this is a standard hours-wage model with a linear budget
constraint. In the second column the results are presented for the model
in which the linearity of the budget constraint is relaxed. The wage rate
has become a function of working hours. The last two columns of Table II
correspond with the model in which hours restrictions are incorporated.
This is implemented by making assumptions about the availability of jobs
with a certain number of hours. we have assumed the distribution as shown
in Table III.
Table III Offered hours distribution
'obs requirir,g- grobability of offer estimated probability in !
... hours per week linear constr. nonlin.constr.
4.8.12.16 pl 1.14 1.19
2o p2 2.94 2.96
z4,28 p3 1.45 1.44
3~ p4 4.75 4.65
36 p5 3.37 3.29
40 P6 28.20 27.51
44 p7 11.76 11.65
48,52,...,64 p8 8.30 8.46
The number of job offers is a random variable and is assumed to follow a
binomial distribution B(pn,Nmax), where timax-l0.
Let us now turn to the estimation results presented in Table II.
Comparing the likelihoods of column one and two oF Table II with each
other, and of columns three and four, we can conclude that the hypothesis
that the wage rate is independent of hours of work is rejected. In the
model with hours restrictions the hours coefficients b and c are insig-
nificant, but their joint effect is significant, although much less
substantial than in the model without hours restrictions. In Figure 1 the
wage-hours equation is drawn, together with the resulting budget
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constraint. It follows that wages decline with hours. This may be
explained by the progressive tax system in The Netherlands.
Let us now turn to the economic interpretation of the parameters
other than those dealing with the shape of the budget line (b, c) or with
the hours restrictions (p's). One should bear in mind that in the case of
the nonlinear budget constraint the labour supply equation is a cubic
equation in h. Therefore we have to be very careful when we compare the
values of the estimated parameters in this case with the values in the
linear case. In Table II we can see that for all versions of the model,
the labour supply curve is forward bending (y)0). Moreover, non-labour
income has a negative effect on hours of work, just as family size and a
dummy for the presence of children younger than six. Turning to the wage
equation, we notice that education has a positive effect on wages and that
wages increase with age until about 40 years.
To be able to compare the predicted hours distributions of the dif-
ferent versions, we present some figures. In Figures 2 to 5, hours
distributions are drawn for each version of the model. The top panel of
Figures 2-5 is the actual hours distribution and the bottom panel is the
hours distribution, predicted by the model. From Figure 2 and Figure 3, we
obser~~e that the model without hours restrictions does not predict the ac-
tual hours distribution very well. This holds both for the model with a
linear budget constraint and for the model with a nonlinear budget
constraint. In both cases the model misses the peaks at 20, 32 and 40
hours. However, the model with hours restrictions appears to pick up all
peaks (see tl~e bottom panels in Figure 4 and 5). The distribution
generated by these models is definitely more in line with the actual
distribution. Comparing the last four figures we can conclude that after
having incorporated hours restrictions not much improvement is gained
anymore by making the budget constraint nonlinear. The offered and
preferred hours distributions are shown in Figure 6 and 7. In both figvres
it is striking to see that of all women only between 20 and 30 ~L prefer
not to work, if they are completely free to choose. However, according to
the estimated job offer dístribution most jobs that are offered require 40
working hours per week. If they have to choose between no job or a 40-hour
job, women choose not to a~ork, as can be deduced from Figure 4 and 5.
`
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Figure 2 Predicted hours distribution from the model without hours
restrictions and with a linear budget constraint in comparison
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Figure 3 Predicted hours distribution from the model without hours
restrictions and with a nonlinear budget constraint in comparison
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Fígure 4 Predicted hours distribution from the model with hours
restrictions and with a linear budget constraint in comparison
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Figure 5 Predicted hours distribution from the model with hours
restrictions and with a nonlinear budget constraint in comparison
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4. Conclusion
A full simultaneous model of labour supply and wage determination
with hours restrictions is estimated. Two main conclusions can be drawn
from our analysis. The hypothesis of a linear budget constraint has to be
rejected; wages appear to decrease with hours of work. And more impor-
tantly, incorporating hours restrictions into the standard labour supply-
wage model produces a better approximation of the actual hours
distribution.
One of the limitations of this model is that it is static. Although
it is obvious that in the future a model of job offers should be dynamic,
this model may be a natural first step towards confronting labour supply
with the demand side. Another drawback of this study is that the hours
restrictions are imposed by a fixed distribution of job offers, common to
all individuals. Further research requires a more structural specification
in this respect, in order to account for differences in employment oppor-
tunities between individuals. Furthermore, tax laws and social security




Let us first gic.e the exact specification of the e~k's, i.e. the
c-alue of e for which utility in h~ equals utility in hk. AFter that we
wi11 give an alternative and probably less efficient formulation of our
model. Then the entire model we have estimated will be given, and finally
ue will show that the standard model is a special case of the extended
model.
The values e~k follow from equating utility between points h~ and hk,
satisfying the budget ccnstraint.
U(n~.Y~) ' U(nk.Yk)







h. Zw t bh? t ch3 t u t h.v
J J J J
y.k : nkZw . bhk t chk . u. hkv
Simple calculations give the solution For e~k:
!J(hk-Xb-e~k-(~S'k)
a
( ó-l~h . ) ( ó-!Jh )
e. - J k log( (~ - I~nk)~(~ - l~n~) ) t
J k I~Z ( nk-h~ )
(I~h~-~)(bhk~~hk) - (I~nk-x)(bn~t~n~) t
(nk-n~)
Y~l~-xb-l~u-rZw-~r~





In bloffitt [1984] a general rule is derived For which h-h~ is preferred to
all other, discrete, number of hours:
24
max ejkCeC min ejk v k~j
kCj k)j
means
Rule (A.4) expresses a choice h-hj in an appropriate range of values of
the unobserved tastes for work, e. A higher value of e corresponds to a
greater taste for work and a lower value of e to a lesser taste for work
(see equation (2.2)). Then the rule says that the value of e has to be
higher than all those values ejk equating
and lower number of working hours (hklChj)
those values ejk equating utility between
of working hours (hkh)hj). This
which the choice







and has to be lower than all
the choice hj and higher number
the indifference curve for
be flatter (i.e. higher e) in
connecting point (h~,yj) with
(hj,yj) results needs to
those indifference curves
(lower number of working hours) and needs to be steeper
(i.e. lower e) in point (hj,yj) than those indifference
point (hj,yj) with points (hkh'ykh)(higher




number of working hours). This
I e-ejkl
hkh hj hkl
Figure 8 The choice h. if max e.kCeC min e.k.J kCj J k~~ J
F h
Having this rule for e and e being normally distributed we can define
probabiliti s for choice hj if the choice set consists of all possible
numbers of ~rking hours hk, k-0,...,m.
z5
But if there is a limited number oF job oFfers, so that individuals
car.not choose freely their optimum number of hours, we have to write down
all possible sets of job offers, and their probability of occurring. In
writing down the probability of observing hj hours, we are only interested
N-1 m-1
in the sets with at least one offer hj. There are S-~ ~ i~ ~ 1 num-
i-1
ber of these sets, to be called Vj(s). Remember that N is the total number
of job offers and m is the number of possible positive distinct hours.
Then the probability of observing hj hours in the set Vj(s) is the
probability of occurence oF the set Vj(s) times the probability that hj is
preferred to all other numbers of hours in the set Vj(s). The likelihood
of observing h-hj hours, given v, is the sum of the probability of obser-
ving hj in the set Vj(s) over all s:
S
L(h-h.lv) - ~ Pr[max e. CeC min e. ~ h E V.(s),v] Pr[V.-V.(s)] (A.5)
J s-1 kCj Jk k~j Jk k J J J
We can see that in this way of modelling, determination of the probability
of observing hj is the same as looking For the appropriate range of values
of e, for all possible sets containing the offer h-hj.
Instead oF this formulation, we could also look For an appropriate
set, for all possible values of e. This is nothing else than changing the
order oF integration. We have now come to the formulation of the model we
have estimated, except for the fact that the number of job offers is still
fixed:
m
L(h-hjlv) -~ Pr( ejk-1CeC ejk~v) Pr( h-hjl ejk-1CeC ejk,v) (A.6)
k-1
Remember that
Pr( h-hj~ ejk-1CeC ejk.v) - Rj
where
Rj -(Qj t Pj)N- Q~ if U(hj.Y(hj):e.v) ) U(O.Y(0):e.v)
- 0 otherwise
z6
Implicit in this probability is the assumption that the individual is
still a utility maximizing person, because the set Jj generating the
probability Qj only encloses job offers less preferred than the revealed
choice hj. Since ejj is not defined, and we have to take care of eCejO and
e~e. as extreme cases, a few adjustments had to be made to obtain~m
equations (2.14)-(2.16). The last term in equation (2.14) (e~ejm) takes
ir.to account the right tail of the distribution of the unobserved e. For
workers the left tail (eCejO) is not included in the summing because not
working always belongs to the choice set and therefore working zero hours
needs to be less preferred for a worker. So by rule (A.4) the unobserved e
has to be greater than ej0.
Furthermore, in the joint hours-wage model we have the difficulty
that we do not observe the wage rate for nonworkers. In practice this
means that the only term that we can use to define probabilities is u0k -
e0k t~v (see also equation (A.3)). But given this joint unobserved ef-
fect, we are not able to evaluate utility. For in the utility function we
find the expression e0k - ghkv, and we only know e0k 4~v . We have solved
this problem by using the fact that we need not know utility at hk, but we
only have to compare it with utility at h-0. We made use of the aforemen-
tioned rule:
h-h. iff max e.kCeC min e.k~ kCj J k~j J
Using ujk - ejk ~~v this is equivalent with
h-hj iff max ujkCe t~~'C min ujk
kCj k)j
For nonworkers this turns into




From rule (A.9) we know that if u is less than u0k, then hk is not
preferred to 0 and therefore belongs to the set J0:
JO - i h~: uCuO~, ~-1,...,m } (A.10)
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So instead of comparing utilities to determine the set J, we compare the
value u- e t~v with values u0~.
To prove that the model without hours restrictions is a special case
of our model if N is fixed, described in Section 2, it is sufficient to
show that the probability oF observing h-hj is equal to one for a par-
ticular range of e, if the number of job offers tends to infinity. The
crucial expression is the probability of observing h-hj (see equation (2-
(Qj ' Pj)N ' Qj (A.11)
Because Qj is always smaller than one, Rj tends to one, for N tending to
infinity, if Qj~ pj equals one. The probability Qjt pj wi11 only be equal
to one for the workers if e falls in a particular range. In all the other
cases Qjf pj will be less than one and Rj will go to zero. Similarly,
there is a range for u such that QO ( see (2.12}) will equal one. We know
those particular ranges for e and u from equation (A.4) and (A.9). These
values for e and u, which are such that working hj hours is more preferred





So the model with fixed N converges to the model without hours ccnstraints
in ~1oFfitt [1984]. If N is a random variable, it must have a degenerate
limiting distribution in infinity in order to attain an equivalent result.
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